I am unable to see the difference in this connectionbetween a power to bring legislation into force, and any other power. The minister cannot abrogate it. Was the announcement thatPart VII would not be implemented a separate breach of duty? Parliament cannot be taken to have legislated on the assumption thatthe general state of affairs in which it was thought desirable and feasible tocreate the power to bring a new regime in effect will necessarily persist in thefuture. If one looks to the Act at large, taking Part VII as an example, thewords appear more than thirty times, omitting compound expressions such as"shall only" and "shall not". On 24 June 1964 a scheme was. Moreover I can foresee circumstances in which it wouldplainly be undesirable for the Secretary of State to be under any such duty.Take, as an example, Part I of the Act of 1988 which introduced newprovisions as to extradition. It also pointed out that the cost ofadministration should come down and that claimants should receive a betterservice. Upon the Secretary of State giving an assurance that no individualclaimant would be prejudiced and no final award would be made to any. In his powerful dissenting judgment in the Court ofAppeal, Hobhouse L.J. The applicants challenge the decision of the Home Secretary not tobring into force the relevant sections of the Act of 1988. In my judgment he cannot lawfully surrenderor release the power contained in section 171(1) so as to purport to excludeits future exercise either by himself or by his successors. By setting up the tariff scheme theminister has set his face in a different direction. By way ofexample, stress was laid by the applicants on the statement in the White Paper(Cm. His words have no lasting effect;he has not put an end to the statutory scheme; only Parliament can do that.So long as he and his successors in office perform in good faith the duty tokeep the implementation of Part VII under review there is in my opinion noground for the court to interfere. Thirdly, although the purpose of the commencement day provision isto facilitate bringing legislation into effect, the width of the discretion givento the minister ought not to be rigidly or narrowly confined. It is important to state in full the relief claimed by therespondents in their notice of application for leave to apply for judicialreview: "(1) A Declaration that the Secretary of State by failing or refusingto bring into force sections 107 to 117, and Schedules 6 and 7of the 1988 Act, has acted unlawfully in breach of his dutyunder the 1988 Act; A Declaration that the Secretary of State, by implementing theTariff Scheme, has acted unlawfully in breach of his duty underthe 1988 act and has abused his common law powers; Mandamus, to order the Secretary of State, in accordance withsection 171 of the 1988 Act, to bring into force by statutoryinstrument sections 108 to 117 and Schedules 6 and 7 of the1988 Act; An Injunction, to prevent the Secretary of State from bringingthe Tariff Scheme into effect from 1st April 1994.". I wouldreject this argument. No court would ever depreciate or call in question ministerialresponsibility to Parliament. In a forceful judgment he held that therewas no duty to implement the statutory scheme, in this respect agreeing withMorritt L.J. I am clearly of opinion that this question must beanswered in the negative. The volume of cases has gone up by one half andis still rising. Where Parliament intends to impose a duty ona Minister to bring legislation into force under a similar formula, it expresslystates the time-limit within which such power is to be exercised: see section5(2) of the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976. Itis quite another to abdicate or relinquish the power altogether. There are I believe three possible meanings. It willbe entirely different in principle and practice both from the presentarrangements and from those contemplated by the Act of 1988. Get 1 point on providing a valid sentiment to this Accordingly although section 171 itself is in force, the provisions of sections108 to 117 of and Schedule 6 and 7 to the Act ("the statutory scheme") canonly be brought into force by the Secretary of State under section 171(1). is to treat these sections as if they did not exist. . Paragraph 38 of the White Paper (Cm.2434), presented to Parliament in December 1993 by the Secretary of State forthe Home Department and the Secretary of State for Scotland, stated: "With the impending demise of the current scheme the provisions inthe 1988 Act will not now be implemented. Judgments tend tobe made pragmatically on the facts of the case and with regardto precedent. But in my judgment that is not material since all three stepsare inextricably interlinked and the legality of the decision to introduce thenew tariff scheme must depend, at least in part, on the legality of steps 1 and2. I must start with some general comments about commencement dayprovisions. Therespondents (applicants for judicial review) are trade unions or other bodieswhose members are liable in the course of their working duties to sufferpersonal injuries as a result of such crimes. by the Lords Spiritual andTemporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen, OPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENT, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT(ORIGINAL APPELLANT AND CROSS-RESPONDENT), FIRE BRIGADES UNION AND OTHERS(ORIGINAL RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS), Lord Keith of KinkelLord Browne-WilkinsonLord MustillLord Lloyd of BerwickLord Nicholls of Birkenhead. Theold scheme, being a scheme for ex gratia payments, conferred no legal rightson the victims of crime. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Original Appellant, and Cross-Respondent) ex parte Fire Brigades Union and others, (Original Respondents and Cross-Appellants). )refused all relief. So instead of providing that sections 108 to 117 shouldcome into force after six months or a year, or other finite period, it left thedate blank. It is notfor the executive, as the Lord Advocate accepted, to state as it did in theWhite Paper that the provisions in the Act of 1988 "will accordingly berepealed when a suitable legislative opportunity occurs". On 23 May 1994, the substantive hearing of the application for judicialreview came before the Queen's Bench Divisional Court (Staughton L.J. They would also in myopinion include (and here I part company from the applicants) theescalating cost of the non-statutory and the enacted statutory scheme;if it appeared that the cost would be much greater than Parliamentenvisaged when the provisions were debated and approved, or if sincethat time economic expectations had significantly declined, these wouldbe factors which a prudent Secretary of State could not be expected toignore and they could in my judgment provide good grounds for delayin the exercise of the power to bring the sections into force.". The position is just the same as if Part VII had never been enacted, or hadbeen repealed soon afterwards. ", On 22 March 1994 leave to apply for judicial review was granted byOwen J. In considering whether themoment has come to appoint a day, as a matter of law the minister must beable to take such matters into account. They held that the Home Secretary was under no duty to bringthe statutory scheme into force. Meanwhile, the Minister is presentlyresolved not to exercise his power under section 171(1) to bring Part VII intoforce. The Government accepted the working party'srecommendations. The interval between the passing of the Act and thebringing into force of Part VII, if it ever happened, was simply a statutoryblank. The Actreceived the Royal Assent on 29 July 1988. At this point the Government decided that the time had come to put thescheme into statutory form, and appointed an Interdepartmental Working Partyto consider how it should be done. That is inherent inthe power Parliament has entrusted to him. The statutoryscheme is treated as redundant, and the intention is to persuade Parliament toremove it from the statute book. Growth in expenditure on compensation for criminal injuries. But the legislative process is for thelegislature, not the judiciary. He has no choice but to do something aboutcompensation for criminal injuries: whether wind up the existing scheme andput nothing in its place; or keep the existing scheme in force; or modify it; orcopy the statutory scheme. The G.C.H.Q. Surely, goesthe argument, the Home Secretary must have power to substitute a non-statutory scheme in the meantime? They introduced legislation, now contained in sections 108to 117 and Schedules 6 and 7 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988. We use cookies on our website to give you the most relevant experience by remembering your preferences and repeat visits. Sending the matter back to theSecretary of State to consider this afresh now would be a pointless exercise.There can be no doubt that, for the financial reasons already noted, hisdecision would still be against bringing sections 108 to 117 into operation atpresent. Until he chooses to call the Parliamentary scheme intoexistence there is a legislative void, and the prerogative subsists untouched. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, House of Lords, R (on the application of Begum (By her litigation friend, Rahman)) v Headteacher, Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, House of Lords, R (on the application of Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, Supreme Court, R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63, Supreme Court, R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, House of Lords, R (on the application of Detention Action) v First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) [2015] EWCA Civ 840, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), R (on the application of Evans) and another v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, Supreme Court, R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, Supreme Court (also known as R (on the application of Buckinghamshire CC)), R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, Supreme Court, R (on the application of Public Law Project) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 39, Supreme Court, Re Dr Bonham’s Case (1608) 8 Coke Reports 107a, 77 ER 638, Court of King’s Bench; Dr Bonham’s Case (1609) 8 Coke Reports 113b, 77 ER 646, Court of King’s Bench, Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, House of Lords, Smith and Grady v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 72, European Court of Human Rights, Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), Divisional Court.