Michael J. Meehan, by appointment of the Court, 447 U.S. 903, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. At the police station, he was informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. E. g., State v. Turner, 32 Or.App. At trial, Edwards sought to suppress his confession. Ibid. United States Supreme Court 451 U.S. 477 (1981) Facts. It is not unusual for a person in custody who previously has expressed an unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a lawyer, to change his mind and even welcome an opportunity to talk. 1 An arrest warrant was issued pursuant to the complaint, and Edwards was arrested at his home later that same day. The extraordinary protections afforded a person in custody suspected of criminal conduct are not without a valid basis, but as with all "good" things they can be carried too far. The Court specifically noted that the right to counsel was a prime example of those rights requiring the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard, id., at 241, but held that "[t]he considerations that informed the Court's holding in Miranda are simply inapplicable in the present case." The fact that Edwards confessed after being read his Miranda rights does not demonstrate that he understood right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. Edwards v. Arizona is one of the leading United States Supreme Court decisions impacting law enforcement in the United States, and, in this regards, Edwards v. Arizona may be a case reference for attorneys and police officers. reversed and remanded, affirmed, etc. The Court held that since the police re-initiated questioning without Edwards’ attorney present, and the state court erroneously applied the appropriate valid waiver standard, Edwards’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated. Whether this is described as police-"initiated" interrogation or in some other way, it clearly was questioning under circumstances incompatible with a voluntary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. Here's why 412,000 law students have relied on our case briefs: Are you a current student of ? The interrogating officer told him that he wanted a statement, but that he did not have the authority to negotiate a deal. Edwards then proceeded to call a county attorney and shortly afterwards he said to his interrogator "I want an attorney before making a deal." Edwards was willing to talk, but he first wanted to hear the taped statement of the alleged accomplice who had implicated him.2 After listening to the tape for several minutes, petitioner said that he would make a statement so long as it was not tape-recorded. The Cop Shop Wiki is a FANDOM Books Community. Edwards said he did not want to see the officers, but the prison guard said he had to talk to them. We think it is clear that Edwards was subjected to custodial interrogation on January 20 within the meaning of Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, and that this occurred at the instance of the authorities. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978). If the suspect is the first to initiate communications with officers and the communication results in disclosing incriminating information, the statements may be introduced at trial. As JUSTICE WHITE has noted, the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965), imposed a general prophylactic rule that is not manifestly required by anything in the text of the Constitution. The officers identified themselves, stated they wanted to talk to him, and informed him of his Miranda rights. Id., at 246. He was informed of his Miranda rights and agreed to answer the officers’ questions. The Court reversed the lower court’s judgment. At first Edwards resisted, but he was told he had to talk to the detectives. In Fare v. Michael C., supra, at 719, the Court referred to Miranda's "rigid rule that an accused's request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease." Various decisions of the Courts of Appeals are to the effect that a valid waiver of an accused's previously invoked Fifth Amendment right to counsel is possible. Whitehead v. United States, 435 U.S. 912 (1978); United States v. Hart, 619 F.2d 325 (CA4 1980); United States v. Hauck, 586 F.2d 1296 (CA8 1978). This website requires JavaScript. Perhaps the Court's opinion can be read as not departing from established doctrine. This was not at his suggestion or request. Statements obtained in violation of this rule are a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. The following morning, two detectives came to see him stating that they wanted to talk to him. After a suspect has been provided with their Miranda warning and in response invokes his right to counsel, are incriminating statements made to officers subsequent to re-initiating communication admissible? But few cases will be as clear as this one. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in result).1. See, e. g., White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186, 191 (CA7 1979) ("in certain instances, for various reasons, a person in custody who has previously requested counsel may knowingly and voluntarily decide that he no longer wishes to be represented by counsel"), cert. The significance of Edwards v. Arizona is also explained, together with the relevance of Edwards v. Arizona impact on citizens and law enforcement. We’re not just a study aid for law students; we’re the study aid for law students. The Court declined to impose the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" standard and required only that the consent be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.